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The Impact of Employer Matching 
on Savings Plan Participation 
under Automatic Enrollment
John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and 
Brigitte C. Madrian
Companies have used a variety of approaches to encourage participation in 
employer-  sponsored savings plans. The most common approach, the pro-
vision of an employer matching contribution, is now oﬀered by the vast 
majority of large ﬁ  rms (Proﬁ  t Sharing Council of America 2006). Even with 
a match, however, savings plan participation rates are often surprisingly 
low (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2005), and empirical studies of matching 
contributions’ eﬀect on plan participation have uniformly found relatively 
small eﬀects (Andrews 1992; Papke and Poterba 1995; Papke 1995; Bas-
sett, Fleming, and Rodrigues 1998; Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox 1998; Choi 
et al. 2002; Even and Macpherson 2005; Duﬂ  o et al. 2006; Engelhardt and 
Kumar 2007).
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Automatic enrollment is an alternative mechanism for increasing sav-
ings plan participation. In a standard opt-  in enrollment scheme, employ-
ees must actively elect to participate in the plan if they wish to contribute. 
In contrast, under automatic enrollment, employees are enrolled in their 
employer’s savings plan at a default contribution rate and asset allocation 
unless they actively make an alternative choice. Relative to the standard opt-
  in approach, automatic enrollment dramatically increases plan participa-
tion, particularly among younger, low- tenure, and lower- income employees 
(Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2002, 2004; Beshears et al. 2008). The 
participation rate increase at one year of tenure is as much as 60 percentage 
points.
All of the companies in which automatic enrollment has been studied to 
date have also oﬀered an employer matching contribution. In principle, the 
match gives most employees a strong reason not to opt out of participation 
(and indeed, few do). But some extensions of automatic enrollment, such as 
the Automatic individual retirement account (IRA) proposal in the United 
States, do not include a matching contribution. The extent to which auto-
matic enrollment’s eﬀectiveness relies on the presence of a match is an open 
question. Without a match, the opt-  out rate could be much higher, since 
participation incentives are greatly reduced. On the other hand, if employee 
inertia drives the automatic enrollment participation eﬀect, we might expect 
high participation rates even without a matching contribution.
We estimate the employer match’s impact on savings plan participation 
under automatic enrollment in two ways. First, we study a large ﬁ  rm (Com-
pany A) using automatic enrollment that replaced its employer match (25 
percent on the ﬁ  rst 4 percent of pay contributed) with an employer contribu-
tion equal to 4 percent of pay plus an annual proﬁ  t-  sharing contribution. 
The employer contribution in the new regime was not contingent on the 
employee’s contributions. We ﬁ  nd that among new hires with six months of 
tenure, savings plan participation rates decreased by, at most, 5 to 6 percent-
age points after the ﬁ  rm eliminated the employer match, and overall average 
employee contribution rates fell by 0.65 percent of pay.
Second, we pool data on savings plan participation at nine ﬁ  rms with 
automatic enrollment. We use variation in the match structure both across 
and within ﬁ  rms to identify the relationship between participation rates 
and the match. This analysis is potentially confounded by ﬁ  rm-  level omit-
ted variables but still oﬀers suggestive evidence. We ﬁ  nd that a 1 percentage 
point decrease in the maximum potential match as a fraction of salary is 
associated with a 1.8 to 3.8 percentage point decrease in plan participation 
at six months of eligibility. Thus, moving from a typical matching structure 
of 50 percent on the ﬁ  rst 6 percent of pay contributed to no match at all 
would reduce savings plan participation under automatic enrollment by 5 
to 11 percentage points. These results, along with those for Company A Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 1 3
discussed before, lead us to conclude that automatic enrollment participa-
tion rates are positively related to match generosity, but the magnitude of 
this eﬀect is modest.
Section 11.1 describes the savings plan and data for Company A. In sec-
tion 11.2, we analyze the impact of Company A’s change from a matching 
contribution to a noncontingent contribution. Section 11.3 examines the 
relationship between plan participation and the employer match amount at 
nine ﬁ  rms with automatic enrollment. Section 11.4 concludes.
11.1      Savings Plan and Data for Company A
Company A is a Fortune 500 company in the information sector. We 
will consider this ﬁ  rm’s employee savings outcomes from January 1, 2002 
through December 31, 2005. Table 11.1 lists the salient features of Company 
A’s 401(k) plan. Plan eligibility is restricted to employees age twenty-  one or 
older. Full-  time employees who satisfy this age requirement are immedi-
ately eligible to participate, while part- time employees are eligible only after 
reaching one year of service and having worked 1,000 hours. Because of 
eligibility diﬀerences between full-   and part-  time employees, we restrict our 
analysis to full-  time employees who are eligible for the plan.1 Throughout 
the sample period, full-  time employees were automatically enrolled in the 
401(k) plan. After thirty days of service, employees who did not make an 
active enrollment election were enrolled at a contribution rate of 3 percent 
of salary allocated entirely to a money market fund. The plan oﬀered six 
other investment options, including employer stock.
Until December 31, 2003, the company made matching contributions at 
a rate of 25 percent on employee contributions up to 4 percent of pay for 
employees who had attained at least one year of service and 1,000 hours of 
work (thus, the maximum possible employer match was 1 percent of pay). 
The maximum contribution rate over this time period was 25 percent of 
pay. On January 1, 2004, the company discontinued the employer match 
and replaced it with an employer contribution of 4 percent of pay plus 
an annual proﬁ  t-  sharing contribution that was not guaranteed in advance. 
In 2004 and 2005, this proﬁ  t-  sharing contribution was 5 percent of salary. 
The employer contributions in the new regime were not contingent upon 
the employee’s contributions. The company also reduced the maximum 
employee contribution rate to 15 percent of pay at this time. Throughout 
the entire sample period, employees were also subject to IRS annual dollar 
1. We do not observe full-   or part-  time status directly in our data. In order to screen out 
part-  time employees, we eliminate those who did not become eligible for the plan within two 
months of hire. Even though full- time employees were immediately eligible upon hire, we keep 
employees with up to a two-  month eligibility lag to allow for the possibility of administrative 
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contribution limits.2 Those employees classiﬁ  ed as “highly compensated” for 
IRS nondiscrimination testing purposes were potentially subject to stricter 
contribution rate limits, and for this reason we exclude them from the fol-
lowing analysis.
Our employee-  level data come from Hewitt Associates, a large U.S. 
beneﬁ  ts administration and consulting ﬁ  rm. We have a series of year-  end 
cross- sections of all Company A employees from 2002 through 2005. These 
cross-  sections contain demographic information such as birth date, hire 
date, gender, and compensation. They also contain 401(k) variables such 
as the initial plan eligibility date, current participation status, initial plan 
participation date, a monthly contribution rate history, and year-  end asset 
allocation and total balances.
Our analysis compares two Company A employee cohorts. The “match 
cohort” contains plan- eligible full- time employees hired between January 1, 
2002 and June 30, 2003. The “no-  match cohort” contains plan-  eligible full-
 time employees hired between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2005. We exclude 
employees hired between July 1, 2003 and December 31, 2003 because these 
Table 11.1  401(k) Plan features at Company A
Eligibility
  Eligible  employees Age  21   
    Eligibility to make employee  Full-  time employees: Immediately upon hire
    contributions Part-  time employees: After 1 year of service 
  and 1,000 hours
    Eligibility for employer contributions After 1 year of service and 1,000 hours
Automatic enrollment Full-  time employees automatically enrolled after 
    30 days at a 3% contribution rate allocated to 
a money market fund
    Employee contributions Before 1/1/2004: Up to 25% of pay
After 1/1/2004: Up to 15% of pay
    Employer contributions Before 1/1/2004: Employer match of 25% on ﬁ  rst 
    4% of pay contributed by employee
Starting 1/1/2004: Noncontingent employer 




  Loans Available
    Hardship withdrawals Available; limited to one per year
  Investment  choices   7 options including employer stock
Source: Summary Plan Descriptions.
2. In the sample we analyze, only eight out of 645 employees contributed enough in a year 
to plausibly be constrained by the IRS annual dollar contribution limits. The results we report 
do not account for this censoring, but they are unaﬀected if we exclude these eight employees 
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employees were hired under the old regime (employer match), but the point 
at which we measure participation and contribution outcomes for our anal-
ysis is after the switch to the new regime (a noncontingent employer contri-
bution). Because our primary outcome variables—plan participation and 
employee contribution rates—are measured at six months of tenure, both 
cohorts are further limited to include only individuals whose employment 
at the company lasted for at least six months.
Company A made several signiﬁ  cant acquisitions during our sample 
period. Unfortunately, our data do not identify those employees who joined 
the ﬁ  rm as a result of these acquisitions. To minimize the potentially con-
founding inﬂ  uence of these acquisitions, we make three further restrictions 
to our sample. First, we exclude employees who lived in states where the 
acquired companies were headquartered. Second, we exclude employees 
whose initial appearance in our data set does not correspond to their year 
of hire (e.g., we exclude employees who are ﬁ  rst observed in our data in the 
2004 cross- section but who are listed as being hired before 2004).3 Third, we 
exclude employees whose hire dates are revised by more than one calendar 
month across diﬀerent year-  end cross-  sections.
Our ﬁ  nal sample contains 645 employees: 293 in the match cohort and 
352 in the no-  match cohort.
11.2      Savings Plan Outcomes under Automatic Enrollment 
with and without an Employer Match: Company A
We begin our analysis by comparing means across the match and no- 
match cohorts. We ﬁ  rst consider plan participation, which we deﬁ  ne as hav-
ing a positive (nonzero) employee contribution rate. The ﬁ  rst row of table 
11.2 shows that 89.1 percent of match-  cohort employees were participating 
in the savings plan at six months of tenure. In contrast, the six-  month par-
ticipation rate for the no-  match cohort is 80.7 percent. This 8.4 percentage 
point diﬀerence in participation rates across the two cohorts is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant and relatively stable from two months of tenure onward. The 
second row of table 11.2 shows average employee contribution rates at six 
months of tenure (including nonparticipants with a contribution rate of 0). 
Given the decline in plan participation, it is not surprising that the average 
contribution rate also falls from 3.60 percent to 2.89 percent of salary after 
the elimination of the employer match. This 0.71 percent drop is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant and driven both by the participation decline and a reduction in 
the average contribution rate conditional on participation from 4.04 percent 
to 3.58 percent of pay. The 0.46 percent drop in the conditional average 
3. We make one exception to this second criterion. There are twenty- two employees who ﬁ  rst 
appear in our data in the year- end 2003 cross- section with December 2002 hire dates. We include 
these employees in the sample because their absence from the 2002 data is likely due to admin-
istrative delays in processing new employees at year-  end rather than due to an acquisition.316        John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian
contribution rate, however, is only statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent 
level and is partly explained by the concurrent reduction in the maximum 
allowable contribution rate from 25 percent to 15 percent of pay.
Figure 11.1 shows the distribution of employee contribution rates at six 
months of tenure for the two cohorts separately. We see that the transition 
from the employer match to the noncontingent contribution was associated 
with a decrease in the fraction of employees contributing, at most, positive 
rates.4 More than two- thirds of employees in both cohorts contribute at the 
3 percent default contribution rate, consistent with previous research on how 
automatic enrollment aﬀects the employee contribution rate distribution 
(Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2002, 2004; Beshears et al. 2008). In 
contrast to previous research, we observe very few employees contributing 
at the 4 percent match threshold (only 2 percent of employees in the match 
cohort and 1 percent of employees in the nonmatch cohort for whom the 
match threshold is no longer relevant). There are several plausible explana-
tions for why so few employees in the match cohort are at the match thresh-
old. First, the employees at Company A are observed at only six months 
of tenure, which does not give them much time to switch from the default 
contribution rate to the match threshold (or another contribution rate of 
their choosing). Second, because the match threshold was only 1 percent-
age point above the default rate, participants’ incentive to increase their 
contribution rate to the match threshold was much weaker than in other 
Table 11.2  Summary statistics on savings plan outcomes and demographic characteristics for 
employees at Company A
   
Match cohort 
(Hired 1/1/2002 
through 6/30/2003)  
Nonmatch cohort 
(Hired 1/1/2004 




Savings plan outcomes (at six months tenure)
  Participation  rate 89.1% 80.7% 2.95
    Average contribution rate (all employees) 3.60% 2.89% 3.01
    Average contribution rate (participants only) 4.04% 3.58% 1.86
Demographic characteristics
  Fraction  female 51.5% 45.7% 1.47
  Average  age 33.21 31.83 2.07
    Annual salary (2004 dollars) $49,167 $40,343 2.93
Sample size   N   293   N   352    
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample includes non-  highly-  compensated, full-  time, savings-  plan- 
eligible employees. Growth in seasonally adjusted average weekly earnings for private sector workers 
from the Current Employment Statistics survey is used to deﬂ  ate employee salaries to 2004 dollars.
4. The decline in the fraction of employees contributing at a rate greater than 15 percent in 
the nonmatch cohort is an artifact of the reduction in the maximum allowable contribution rate 
from 25 percent to 15 percent of pay that coincided with the switch from a matching contribu-
tion to a noncontingent contribution.Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 1 7
ﬁ  rms studied (Carroll et al. 2009). Finally and perhaps most importantly, 
employees were not eligible to receive matching contributions until having 
completed one year of service, so most of the beneﬁ  ts from contributing at 
the match threshold did not accrue to employees at six months of tenure.
Of course, the transition from an employer match to a noncontingent 
contribution may have been accompanied by other changes at Company 
A that caused the savings plan choice diﬀerences between the two cohorts. 
Table 11.2 shows that relative to the nonmatch cohort, the match cohort was 
disproportionately female, somewhat older, and had a higher average salary.5 
Not controlling for these diﬀerences could make the participation decline 
due to the employer match elimination look larger than it really was.
Table 11.3 shows the results of regressions that include demographic 
explanatory variables. The ﬁ  rst two columns show the coeﬃcients from a 
linear probability regression of savings plan participation at six months of 
tenure on an indicator for having been hired with an employer match in 
place, gender, age, and income in 2004 dollars. In column (1), we control lin-
early for age and income, whereas in column (2) we include age and income 
Fig. 11.1    Distribution of contribution rates with and without and employer match 
at six months of tenure: Company A
5. We deﬂ  ated the salaries of employees in both cohorts to 2004 dollars using the growth 
in seasonally adjusted average weekly earnings for private sector workers from the Current 
Employment Statistics survey. Part of the diﬀerence in average age and income between the 
cohorts might be the result of an internship program that took place in the second half of the 
sample period. Compared to other employees, interns probably have weaker motives to par-
ticipate in the 401(k) plan. To make sure that the presence of interns is not driving our results, 
we drop the twenty-  nine employees in the sample with incomes of less than $10,000 and redo 
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splines.6 The estimated 6.0 to 6.7 percentage point participation impact of 
having a match is statistically signiﬁ  cant and somewhat lower than the raw 
8.4 percentage point diﬀerence seen in table 11.2. A probit speciﬁ  cation (col-
umns [3] and [4]) yields estimated employer match marginal eﬀects of 5.4 to 
6.5 percentage points, also statistically signiﬁ  cant. Columns (5) and (6) list 
the marginal eﬀects from a tobit regression of employee contribution rates, 
which are censored below at zero and above at 25 percent (the match cohort) 
or 15 percent (the nonmatch cohort). Eliminating the employer match at 
Company A is associated with a contribution rate decline of about 0.66 
percent of salary, an eﬀect that is statistically signiﬁ  cant and only slightly 
less than the 0.71 percent raw eﬀect in table 11.2.
In summary, controlling for demographic diﬀerences between the match 
and nonmatch cohorts reduces but does not eliminate the estimated impact 
of the employer match under automatic enrollment. Note that these esti-
mates represent the combined eﬀect of removing the match and replacing 
it with a noncontingent contribution. The replacement of a match with a 
(relatively larger) noncontingent contribution generates a substitution eﬀect 
that discourages employee contributions and a net income eﬀect that also 
discourages employee contributions. Employee contributions are no longer 
subsidized and the employee has more total savings (employee plus employer 
contributions) for any given employee contribution.7 Our estimates provide 
an upper bound of the eﬀects due solely to the removal of the employer 
match, since the simultaneous introduction of the noncontingent employer 
contribution generates an income eﬀect that suppresses employee contri-
butions.8
Our analysis also sheds light on the question of savings crowd-  out. Our 
estimates provide an upper bound on the negative participation eﬀects due 
solely to the introduction of the noncontingent contribution, since the simul-
taneous elimination of the match is likely to have discouraged employee 
participation.9
One limitation of many savings studies that use administrative data is the 
inability to address potentially oﬀsetting (or reinforcing) changes in savings 
6. The age spline has knots at thirty, forty, and ﬁ  fty years, and the income spline has knots 
at $20,000, $40,000, $60,000, and $80,000.
7. The employee loses a 25 percent match on contributions up to 4 percent of income but 
gains both a noncontingent employer contribution equal to 4 percent of income and a non-
contingent proﬁ  t-  sharing contribution.
8. On the other hand, there are some plausible reasons that the introduction of the noncon-
tingent contribution could increase employee contributions. Employees might view it as a signal 
that their expected future income growth has fallen. Alternatively, employees could interpret 
the noncontingent contribution as implicit advice that their optimal savings rate is higher than 
they previously believed.
9. A match unambiguously increases participation in a two-  period model. Opposite eﬀects 
are possible in models with more periods. However, the empirical literature on matching gener-
ally ﬁ  nds positive participation eﬀects. Note that even in a two-  period model, matching need 
not increase the average employee contribution due to the substitution eﬀect.320        John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian
behavior outside of the account being studied. This caveat applies here as 
well. Employees have additional assets outside their 401(k) plan, and some 
employees also have other savings plan assets within Company A, which has 
an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). However, most of the employ-
ees in our nonmatch sample are not eligible to participate in the ESOP 
(employees must have one year of service to be eligible). Moreover, the plan 
is nonelective; the company makes ESOP contributions on an annual basis 
to all employees who are eligible. With more years of data, it might be pos-
sible to assess the extent to which changes in ESOP balances across the two 
cohorts aﬀect employees’ 401(k) choices at Company A.10 Unfortunately, the 
data are not presently available to undertake such an analysis, and we do not 
observe any other ﬁ  nancial assets of this company’s employees.
11.3      Employer Matching Level and Savings Plan Participation 
under Automatic Enrollment at Nine Companies
We now broaden our analysis to explore the relationship between the 
generosity of the employer match and savings plan participation under 
automatic enrollment at nine companies. We use variation in the employer 
match structure both within and across ﬁ  rms for identiﬁ  cation. However, 
because of the potential existence of ﬁ  rm- level omitted variables, the follow-
ing results must be interpreted with caution.
Table 11.4 describes the match structure at the nine companies used in 
our analysis. The match rate varies from no match at Company A (begin-
ning in 2004 for the nonmatch cohort) to a 133 percent match on the ﬁ  rst 6 
percent of pay at Company I. Conditional on oﬀering a match, the match 
threshold ranges from 2 percent of pay for employees with less than one year 
of tenure at Company F to 7 percent of pay at Company B. Two companies 
have changes in their employer match over our sample period: Company A 
(analyzed in sections 11.2 and 11.3), which replaced its employer match of 
25 percent on the ﬁ  rst 4 percent of pay contributed with a noncontingent 
employer contribution in January 2004; and Company B, which gradually 
increased its match rate from 60 percent to 62 percent to 65 percent on the 
ﬁ  rst 7 percent of pay contributed.
For this section’s analysis, we use data that are identical in structure to 
the Company A data described in section 11.2. We pool employees at the 
nine ﬁ  rms who are observed in at least one of the year-  end cross-  sections 
from 2002 through 2005.11 Our sample is limited to employees at these ﬁ  rms 
10. Madrian and Shea (2001), who ﬁ  rst documented large participation increases following 
automatic enrollment in a 401(k) savings plan, ﬁ  nd no evidence of oﬀsetting savings behavior 
in the Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) of the company they studied.
11. Three ﬁ  rms did not have data available for all four years. We drop three additional ﬁ  rm-
  years because diﬀerent employees within a company were oﬀered diﬀerent matches in these 
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who meet the following criteria: they became eligible for their employer-
  sponsored savings plan between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2005; they 
became eligible when they were between twenty-  one and sixty-  ﬁ  ve years 
of age; they became eligible when automatic enrollment was in eﬀect; and 
they did not leave the company within six months of becoming eligible. 
Unlike the analysis in sections 11.2 and 11.3, we do not attempt to ﬁ  lter out 
part- time employees because we are unable to identify them for some of the 
companies.
To assess the relationship between the employer match and savings plan 
participation under automatic enrollment, we run a linear probability 
regression12 of savings plan participation at six months of eligibility13 on 
age, income in 2004 dollars, gender, and the generosity of the employer 
match. Our key dependent variable of interest is the maximum employer 
match (as a fraction of income) that a participant can receive by contribut-
ing at the match threshold and fulﬁ  lling all match-  related service require-
ments, given the match structure in place at six months of eligibility. The 
maximum employer match does not necessarily correspond to the matching 
contribution an employee could receive after only six months of eligibility. 
For example, the maximum employer match as just deﬁ  ned at Company D 
is 4.2 percent of pay (a 70 percent match on the ﬁ  rst 6 percent of pay), even 
though employees with less than one year of tenure can receive a match of 
at most 2.1 percent of pay (a 35 percent match on the ﬁ  rst 6 percent of pay). 
Table 11.4 lists the maximum employer match used in our regression for 
each of the nine ﬁ  rms.
Our employer match variable deﬁ  nition rests on the assumption that 
employees are forward- looking with respect to the match when making their 
decision about whether to opt out of savings plan participation under auto-
matic enrollment. Given that the service requirement to obtain the maxi-
mum employer match is at most one year in our sample, we feel that this 
assumption is appropriate. Only three of our nine ﬁ  rms (companies A, C, 
and H) have matches linked to tenure. We also assume that the match rate 
changes within companies A and B were surprises that were not known to 
employees in advance, since we deﬁ  ne the maximum employer match using 
the match structure in place at the time we measure participation.
Because our maximum employer match variation is largely across-  ﬁ  rm 
variation, we are precluded from putting ﬁ  rm-  level ﬁ  xed eﬀects in these 
regressions. We do, however, calculate Huber-  White standard errors with 
clustering at the ﬁ  rm level.
12. Even though our dependent variable is binary, we use a linear probability regression 
rather than a probit in order to facilitate the graphical display of the results in ﬁ  gure 11.2.
13. Instead of measuring participation at six months of tenure, as done earlier for Company 
A, we measure participation after six months of eligibility because some ﬁ  rms’ employees are 
not immediately eligible upon hire. For most employees in the sample, however, six months of 
tenure and six months of eligibility are equivalent.Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation    3 2 3
Column (1) in table 11.5 gives the coeﬃcient estimates from the regres-
sion previously described when no other control variables are included. In 
this speciﬁ  cation, decreasing the maximum employer match by 1 percent 
of salary is associated with a plan participation reduction at six months 
of eligibility under automatic enrollment of 2.8 percentage points. This is 
somewhat smaller than the 5 to 6 percentage point decline observed at Com-
pany A when it eliminated its employer match. However, as noted earlier, the 
Company A estimate is an upper bound on the true eﬀect of match removal, 
since the match was replaced with a noncontingent employer contribution 
that is theoretically expected to decrease participation.
Figure 11.2 displays the regression results from the ﬁ  rst column of table 
Table 11.5  The eﬀect of the employer match on savings plan participation under 
automatic enrollment
Full sample Companies with control data
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Maximum match 2.7818∗∗∗ 2.1995∗∗∗ 3.7519∗∗∗ 1.7784∗∗∗
(0.6131) (0.3257) (0.2623) (0.4290)
Gender
  Female No 0.0021 No 0.0075
(0.0059) (0.0072)
    Indicator for gender missing No –0.3254 No No
(0.6318)
Age
  Linear  spline No Yes No Yes
    Indicator for age missing No –0.4109 No No
(0.2125)
Income (2004 USD)
  Linear  spline No Yes No Yes
    Indicator for income missing No 0.4882∗∗∗ No No
(0.1128)
Constant 0.7778∗∗∗ 0.1722 0.7536∗∗∗ 0.2281
(0.0271) (0.1254) (0.0028) (0.1265)
Sample size   N   44,279   N   44,279   N   35,895   N   35,895
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Huber-  White robust standard errors with clustering by ﬁ  rm are reported in parentheses. The 
sample includes savings plan-  eligible employees ages twenty-  one to sixty-  ﬁ  ve. All regressions are linear 
probability regressions. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for savings plan participation. The 
maximum match is the maximum fraction of income an employee can receive in matching contributions 
by contributing at the match threshold and fulﬁ  lling all service requirements, given the match structure 
in place when the employee had six months of 401(k) eligibility. The coeﬃcient on the maximum match 
represents the percentage point increase in the participation rate when employees are oﬀered an addi-
tional 1 percent of their salary in matching contributions. The spline for age has knots at thirty, forty, and 
ﬁ  fty years, and the spline for income has knots at $20,000, $40,000, $60,000, and $80,000. Growth in 
seasonally adjusted average weekly earnings for private sector workers from the Current Employment 
Statistics survey is used to deﬂ  ate employee salaries to 2004 dollars.
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11.5 graphically. Every data point in ﬁ  gure 11.2 corresponds to a group of 
employees that shares the same ﬁ  rm and maximum employer match (ﬁ  rms 
whose match changes over time are represented in the graph by more than 
one data point). The maximum match is on the x-  axis, and the raw savings 
plan participation rate is on the y-  axis. The regression line from the ﬁ  rst 
column of table 11.5 is also shown. Figure 11.2 shows that the positive rela-
tionship between the maximum match and participation estimated in table 
11.5 is robust and does not seem to be driven by outliers.
In column (2) of table 11.5, we add control variables, using linear splines 
for age and income as well as indicator variables for missing gender, age, 
and income data.14 The inclusion of demographic controls reduces the esti-
mated impact of the employer match slightly: decreasing the maximum 
employer match by 1 percent of salary is associated with a 2.2 percentage 
point decline in participation, rather than the 2.8 percentage point decline 
shown in column (1).
Most of the individuals for whom gender, age, or income data are miss-
ing come from three ﬁ  rms. Therefore, we restrict the sample in column (3) 
Fig. 11.2    Relationship between the employer match and savings plan participation 
under automatic enrollment at nine ﬁ  rms
Notes: Each point represents the raw participation rate among individuals who are employed 
by a given ﬁ  rm with the speciﬁ  ed match amount. Participation is deﬁ  ned as having a positive 
employee contribution rate at six months of eligibility. The match amount is deﬁ  ned as the 
maximum fraction of income an employee can receive in employer matching contributions by 
contributing at the match threshold and fulﬁ  lling all service requirements, given the match 
structure in place when the employee had six months of 401(k) eligibility. The slope and inter-
cept of the ﬁ  tted line are given by the coeﬃcients on the match amount and the constant in 
column (1) of table 11.5.
14. The results are qualitatively similar if we use linear controls for age and income rather 
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to the six ﬁ  rms for which we can construct demographic controls.15 When 
we run the regression without control variables—as in column (1)—on this 
restricted sample, the estimated impact of the employer match increases 
relative to that in column (1); participation declines by 3.8 percentage points 
when the maximum match decreases by 1 percent of pay. This suggests that 
there are some diﬀerences between the companies in our sample for which 
we do and do not have demographic data.
Finally, in column (4), we add the demographic control variables to the 
regression restricted to companies with demographic information. Just as 
in the full sample, adding demographic controls to this restricted sample 
reduces the estimated impact of the employer match. Across all of the spec-
iﬁ  cations in table 11.5, the coeﬃcient on the maximum employer match 
ranges from 1.8 to 3.8, indicating that decreasing the maximum employer 
match by 1 percent of salary reduces savings plan participation at six months 
of eligibility under automatic enrollment by 1.8 to 3.8 percentage points.
11.4    Conclusions
Automatic enrollment is an increasingly important feature of the retire-
ment savings landscape. A recent survey of large U.S. ﬁ  rms found that 36 
percent already automatically enroll new employees, and 55 percent of ﬁ  rms 
without automatic enrollment say that they are very likely or somewhat 
likely to adopt it within a year (Hewitt Associates 2007). To date, all the auto-
matic enrollment savings plans that have been studied have had an employer 
match. The U.S. pension regulations encourage the use of matching through 
safe harbor clauses; ﬁ  rms can avoid nondiscrimination testing if they have 
a suﬃciently generous match. However, there is also a safe harbor for non-
contingent employer contributions.16
This chapter aims to address how eﬀective automatic enrollment might 
be in the absence of an employer match. Using two estimation strategies, 
one based on the substitution of the employer match with a noncontingent 
employer contribution, and the other based primarily on variation in the 
employer match across ﬁ  rms, we ﬁ  nd that participation rates under auto-
matic enrollment decline only modestly when the employer match is elimi-
nated or reduced. The switch from a matching contribution to a noncontin-
gent contribution at Company A caused the plan participation rate at six 
months of tenure to drop by 5 to 6 percentage points. In a sample of nine 
15. Even within those companies for which we have demographic information, some employ-
ees are nonetheless missing this information. We drop these employees with missing demo-
graphic data from the regressions in columns (3) and (4).
16. To obtain safe harbor status, the plan must provide either a matching contribution equal 
to 100 percent of contributions up to 1 percent of pay and 50 percent of contributions for the 
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ﬁ  rms with automatic enrollment, decreasing the employer match amount by 
1 percent of pay was associated with a 1.8 to 3.8 percentage point decrease 
in the plan participation rate at six months of eligibility. Collectively, these 
results imply that moving from a typical matching structure of 50 percent 
on the ﬁ  rst 6 percent of pay contributed to no match at all would reduce 
savings plan participation under automatic enrollment by 5 to 11 percentage 
points. Interestingly, these results are similar to the employer match eﬀect 
on participation estimated by Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) in a sample of 
older employees, most of whom were not subject to automatic enrollment.
Therefore, the success of automatic enrollment at increasing participation 
in employer- sponsored savings plans does not appear to rely much on having 
an employer match. It thus seems likely that automatic enrollment will also 
be eﬀective at increasing participation in other contexts that do not naturally 
lend themselves to a matching contribution.
These results also suggest that companies with automatic enrollment need 
not oﬀer a match in order to achieve broad-  based participation. However, 
the employer match may be valuable for reasons other than the induce-
ment that it creates to participate. For example, as a tax-  favored form of 
compensation, the employer match may be important in the recruiting and 
retention of employees even if it does not have a large impact on savings 
plan participation.
However, the experience of Company A suggests that some of the pur-
poses served by an employer match could be achieved with a noncontingent 
employer contribution as well. The merits of an employer match versus a 
noncontingent contribution likely hinge not only on their average impact 
on savings plan outcomes (e.g., lower participation with a noncontingent 
contribution), but also on their distributional impact. For example, a non-
contingent contribution will likely increase total savings for those employees 
least inclined to save, but its eﬀects elsewhere in the savings distribution are 
ambiguous, since a match tends to cause herding at the match threshold. 
This herding may either increase or decrease savings, depending on how high 
the match threshold is and what savings rate employees would have chosen 
in the absence of a match.
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Comment  Daniel McFadden
The rise of 401(k) plans as a channel for providing retirement incomes to 
employees makes enrollment in these plans increasingly important for the 
welfare of future retirees. The authors utilize persuasive natural experiments 
to quantify behavioral response to key 401(k) plan features: whether the 
default is automatic enrollment unless the employee opts out or nonenroll-
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